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We demonstrate that multiple stationary rational-expectations equilibria exist in a
version of Lucas’s island economy. The existence of these equilibria follows from the fact
that there is an indeterminate set of monetary equilibria in the two-period overlapping-
generations model. We show how to construct stationary rational-expectations equilibria
by randomizing over the set of nonstationary monetary equilibria. In some of our
equilibria, a positively sloped Phillips curve exists even though our economy contains no
signal-extraction problem as in the original Lucas paper. Our equilibria are indexed by
beliefs and are examples of the existence of sunspot equilibria in which allocations may
differ across states of nature for which preferences, technology, and endowments are
identical. Our technique for constructing stationary sunspot equilibria should prove useful
in a wide class of models in which an indeterminate stationary equilibrium exists.
Keywords: Indeterminacy, Sunspots, Dynamic General Equilibrium, Rational
Expectations
1. PREAMBLE
We wrote this piece in 1984, when Farmer was an assistant professor at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania and Woodford was visiting Penn, having recently completed
his doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. At that time, the idea
of a sunspot equilibrium was much discussed at the University of Pennsylvania,
but was regarded by most macroeconomists as an esoteric branch of general equi-
librium theory of little obvious importance for macroeconomics. The examples of
sunspot equilibria that were known at the time were highly stylized and involved,
for example, only a finite number of random states.
The contribution of our paper was to exploit the indeterminacy of equilibrium,
a phenomenon that is common in overlapping-generations models, to construct
sunspot equilibria in a version of the model introduced by Robert Lucas (1972).
The technique that we describe for constructing sunspot equilibria has proven to be
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widely applicable to intertemporal general equilibrium models with indeterminacy,
and has since been exploited in a variety of different environments, including many
models with infinite-lived agents, some of which are quite similar to the kind of
stochastic growth model used in real-business-cycle theory.
The equilibria constructed using this method are described by stationary proba-
bility distributions that fulfill all of the desiderata of rational choice in a stationary
environment, but in which the beliefs of agents are no longer uniquely determined
by economic fundamentals. In the context of our example, we show that there is a
continuum of alternative stationary rational-expectations equilibria, and that some
of these equilibria have Keynesian features, in the sense that quantities rather than
prices respond to monetary shocks. We do not take up the question of the quanti-
tative similarity of the predicted stationary fluctuations to the properties of actual
aggregate data, although our methods would allow such questions to be addressed,
as they have been more recently, in the context of more sophisticated models.
Our purpose in publishing the article here is to provide a convenient English-
language source. Although the paper is widely cited and a Spanish translation was
published in 1987, it has never been published in English.
2. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of many stationary rational-expectations
equilibria in a variant of the model considered by Lucas (1972). Several authors
[e.g., Taylor (1977), Shiller (1978), Futia (1981), Gourieroux et al. (1982), Sargent
and Wallace (1984)] have observed that linear rational expectations models may
possess a continuum of stationary equilibria, but the hope has been expressed
that the multiplicity is possible only because these models are not derived rig-
orously from the optimizing behavior of agents [e.g., Taylor (1977, pp. 1378,
1383); Gourieroux et al. (1982, pp. 424–25)]. However, a growing literature shows
that this is not the case. For example, it is known that continua of nonstation-
ary perfect-foresight equilibria may exist in overlapping-generations models [e.g.,
Calvo (1978), Wallace (1980)], that a large number of periodic perfect-foresight
equilibria may exist in such models [Grandmont (1985)], that a large number of
stochastic rational-expectations equilibria may exist in these models, even when
there is nothing random about preferences, endowments, or technology [Shell
(1977), Peck (1984)], and indeed that such models may possess many stationary
rational expectations equilibria [Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and Guesnerie (1982,
1986)]. This suggests that the results of Hansen and Sargent (1980), that rational-
expectations equilibrium is unique for a class of economies in which a single agent
solves a linear-quadratic optimization problem, is critically dependent upon the
assumption that the agent is infinite-lived.
Our paper demonstrates a method for constructing large classes of stationary
rational-expectations equilibria in exact optimizing models. We hope that this
technique will clarify the importance of the aforementioned developments for
business-cycle theory. Nonstationary equilibria may not be considered interesting
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models of the business cycle both because it is the repetitive character of these
phenomena that has attracted most attention and because, arguably, the rational-
expectations hypothesis is most plausible in a stationary context. The multiple
stationary equilibria discussed by Azariadis, Guesnerie, and Grandmont avoid this
objection, but the techniques used by these authors allow them to display only
stationary equilibria of very special kinds—deterministic cycles on the one hand
and two-state Markov processes on the other. The stationary equilibria that we dis-
play, by contrast, are of the stochastic autoregressive form, which is characteristic
of econometric work on the business cycle. Our results have several important
implications for current discussions of rational expectations in macroeconomic
models.
A first implication concerns the discussion of the neutrality of money in the
Lucas (1972) paper. A single stationary rational-expectations equilibrium is dis-
cussed in that paper, and it has the property that, in the absence of informational
asymmetries, monetary shocks (stochastic interest payments on money balances)
would have no effect on output. Hence, informational asymmetries are proposed
as an explanation of the Phillips-curve correlation between inflation and output.
In our model, by contrast, it is shown that even in the absence of any imperfect
information, almost all of the large class of stationary equilibria display a nonver-
tical Phillips-curve relationship. In some of these equilibria, output is positively
correlated with inflation; in others, the correlation is negative. In both cases, the
correlation exists in a stationary state because of the self-fulfilling character of
expectations.
A second implication concerns the incidence of an inflation tax used as a means
of financing government expenditure. It often is supposed that alternative methods
of government finance can result in different allocations across generations of the
burden of paying for a given government expenditure. However, our model, shows
that, even given a particular method of government finance (e.g., an inflation tax),
the integenerational allocation of the burden may be indeterminate.
A final implication concerns the long-standing debate over the possibility of
sticky nominal wages. Previous authors have assumed that predetermined nom-
inal wages indicate that agents must commit themselves to particular terms of
employment before the realization of an aggregate demand shock. We show, in-
stead, that there may exist a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium in which
nominal wages are predetermined, even if all labor is traded in a competitive spot
market after all stochastic shocks have become common knowledge. This result,
like the others, results from the existence in our model of self-fulfilling price expec-
tations, and hence may be seen as a demonstration that the possibly self-fulfilling
nature of expectations noted by Cass and Shell (1983) should be taken seriously
by macroeconomists.
3. MODEL
Our economy consists of a sequence of overlapping generations, each of which
lives for two consecutive periods. All individuals in all generations are assumed to
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have the same preferences, and so, without loss of generality, we refer to a single
representative agent from each generation. We refer to the generation that lives in
periods t and t C 1 as generation t . There is a single perishable consumption good
each period, produced at constant returns to scale through the labor of the young
agents in that period. During the first period of life, each member of generation t
chooses to supply nt units of labor, which yield nt units of output. It is assumed
that individuals wish to consume only during the second period of life.1 Let the
consumption by each member of generation t be ctC1. Preferences are described
by the utility function
u.nt ; ctC1/ D ctC1 ¡ 12 n2t (1)
for the members of each generation. As is discussed in the Appendix, our results
do not depend on this special utility function, which we choose for computational
convenience.
In addition to labor output, there is one other good: fiat money, issued by the
government. This money enters the economy in two ways. The government pur-
chases some of the consumption good each period, in the amount gt in period t ,
and pays for these purchases by issuing new money.2 The government also makes
beginning-of-period money transfers to the members of the older generation in
each period, in a quantity proportional to the pretransfer holdings of each. If we
let mt denote the money supply per member of generation t at the end of period
t , then the posttransfer balances held by each member of that generation at the
beginning of period tC1 are mt xtC1. Because the consumption good is perishable,
all savings are achieved by holding fiat money. It is assumed that no individuals
care about their descendants, so that there is no inheritance; fiat money holdings
at the beginning of the second period of life are entirely spent on consumption
during that period.
Our model simplifies Lucas’s model in two important respects. First, we assume
that all exchange takes place in a single competitive spot market each period; there
is only one “island.” Second, we assume that all individuals know the value of
the government policy variables gt and xt in period t ; there is no asymmetric
information. We discard these features of the Lucas model, because we wish to
show that the Lucas mechanism, involving misunderstanding of the significance of
price-level fluctuations on a given island, is not necessary in order for a short-run
Phillips-curve relation to be consistent with rational expectations.
Let Pt be the money price of the consumption good in period t . Then, young
individuals in period t supply labor nt so as to maximize the expected value of (1),
subject to the budget constraints
mt < nt Pt ; (2)
PtC1ctC1<mt xtC1: (3)
In equilibrium, conditions (2) and (3) will hold with equality, and nt will satisfy
the first-order condition3
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where Et denotes expectation conditional upon information available to all in-
dividuals in period t . The national income accounting identity in period t will
be
ct C gt D nt : (5)
Substituting (2), (3), and (5) into (4) yields
n2t D Et [ntC1 ¡ gtC1]; (6)
which must hold each period in any rational-expectations equilibrium.
We assume that the government policy variables xt and gt are chosen randomly
each period, and that these variables are both independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) across periods. That is, there is a cumulative distribution function
F.x/ such that xt is drawn independently from this distribution each period, and
a cumulative distribution function H.g/ such that gt is drawn independently from
this distribution each period, and the stochastic processes for x and g are indepen-
dent of each other. We also assume that F.x/ has bounded support [a; b], where
a> 0 that H.g/ has bounded support [c; d] where c> 0 and both distributions are
common knowledge.
We then define stationary rational-expectations equilibrium in the following
manner:
DEFINITION. An equilibrium price function is a continuous positive function
`.n; x; g/ bounded and bounded away from zero, defined for n in some bounded
nonnegative interval, x 2 [a; b] and g 2 [c; d] such that
(i) PtC1Dmt`.nt ; xtC1; gtC1/ is a market clearing price in period t C 1, given individu-





d F.x/ d H.g/: (7)
(ii) There exists an invariant distribution for n, for the stochastic process for n implied
by the price function `; that is, there exists a cumulative distribution function, ….n/









d F.x/ d H.g/ d….n/; (8)
where 1n0 is the indicator function for the set [e; n0].4 Equation (7) states that the
stationary stochastic process for n implied by the price function `, that is,
ntC1 D xtC1
`.nt ; xtC1; gtC1/
C gtC1; (9)
always satisfies condition (6). Equation (8) states that if ….n/describes the probability
distribution for nt in any period, the derived probability distribution for ntC1 using
equation (9) also will be ….n/.
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This definition is more general than that considered by Lucas, and it accounts for
the multiplicity of stationary rational-expectations equilibria that we find. Hence,
the generalization demands some discussion. Lucas allows only for price functions
of the form `.n; x/ D `.x/, and demands only that (7) be satisfied. The existence
of an invariant distribution for n is guaranteed in that case, because it is derived
from the distribution F.x/ using the relation nD x=`.x/. It is our contention that
any predetermined variable might reasonably be included as an argument of the
equilibrium price function. It is this restriction that allows Lucas to derive his
classical neutrality of money theorem, namely, that in the absence of a signal
extraction problem, the unique rational-expectations equilibrium is of the form
PtC1DmtC1=n¯ , where n¯ is a constant rate of labor supply (the natural rate), so
that even the short-run Phillips curve must be vertical.
Like Lucas, we restrict our attention to stationary rational-expectations equilib-
ria. By this, we mean not only that the equilibrium price function does not depend
on time, but also that there exist invariant distributions for all real variables in
the model. This restriction is reasonable, because there is no good argument why
individuals should have rational expectations except in such a stochastic stationary
state.
It is customary, for example, in the literature on linear rational-expectations




a j et¡ j ;
where Pt is the endogenous variable in the model and et is the innovation in period
t of the exogenous variable, satisfying the square-summability condition
1X
jD0
ja j j2 <1
and the relevant equilibrium condition. [See, e.g., Lucas (1975), Futia (1981).]
Attention is not restricted to functions in which the endogenous variable depends
only on the current value of the exogenous shock; instead, it may depend on the
entire history of shocks. On the other hand, one usually restricts one’s attention
to stationary solutions, both in the sense that the coefficients a j do not depend
upon time, and in the sense that there exists an invariant distribution with finite
variance for the endogenous variable (this is the reason for the square-summability
condition). It is our supposition that Lucas considers only price functions of the
form `.n; x/D`.x/ as a way of ensuring that his solution will be stationary in
this sense. We therefore regard our generalization of the definition as a natural one.
It is shown below that not all equilibria satisfying our more general definition are
of the Lucas type.
The considerations just mentioned give us no reason to restrict our attention to
price functions of the form `.nt ; xtC1; gtC1/. This amounts to an assumption that
the past history of government policy affects current prices only through the
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quantity of output in the previous period. More general functional forms might
reasonably be considered. However, we show below that even when we restrict
our attention to this class of functions, an extremely large number of stationary
rational-expectations equilibria exist. Nor have we any reason to require that the
invariant distribution ….n/ has bounded support. However, certain proofs having
to do with the existence of and the convergence to the invariant distribution are
simpler in this case, and we show below that equilibria in which ….n/ has bounded
support do exist in the case of the model considered here.
4. STOCHASTIC INTEREST PAYMENTS
In this section, we consider a particular case of the model set out above, that in
which real government expenditure is equal to a constant, g> 0. The only stochas-
tic shocks then are stochastic interest payments on money, as in Lucas’s paper.
The case that we treat in this section thus differs from Lucas’s model in only one
respect: We assume g> 0, rather that g D 0. This is an important stipulation.
If one sets x D 1 for all time (no interest payments), so that there is nothing
stochastic in the model at all, and looks at the set of perfect-foresight equilibria,
one finds an important difference between the cases gD 0 and g> 0. In the case
of no government expenditure, the model is an example of what Gale (1973) calls
“the Samuelson case.” As is well known, there are two stationary equilibria in such
a model, a monetary steady state in which labor supply (and hence real balances)
each period equals n¯ (see Figure 1A), and a nonmonetary steady state in which
money is not valued and no labor is supplied in any period. In addition, there is
a one-parameter family of perfect-foresight equilibria in which money is initially
valued, but asymptotically comes to have zero value. In these equilibria the labor
supply approaches zero as the rate of inflation accelerates. (See Figure 1A for
the construction of a member of this class.) In the case that g> 0, by contrast
(see Figure 1B), there are two monetary steady states. This is because of the
familiar proposition that there are two rates of money creation that will support a
given level of inflation-financed government expenditure [Bailey (1956), Sargent
and Wallace (1984)].5 As in the gD 0 case, one steady state is determinate and
the other is indeterminate6; that is, there is a one-parameter family of perfect-
foresight equilibria converging asymptotically to the high-inflation steady state
(corresponding to labor supply n in Figure 1B), whereas the only perfect-foresight
equilibrium converging to the low-inflation steady state (labor supply n¯ ) is the
equilibrium that begins with that rate of inflation. The large family of stationary
rational-expectations equilibria that we find in the case of stochastic government
policy are all in the vicinity of the indeterminate monetary steady state (in a sense to
be displayed shortly); and the existence of an indeterminate monetary steady state
is crucial to the method we use to construct our examples of multiple stationary
rational-expectations equilibria.7 This is the reason for the assumption that g> 0.
We assume in this section that the stochastic interest factor, xt , is i.i.d., being
drawn each period from a distribution F.x/ with bounded support [a; b] where




FIGURE 1. Monetary and nonmonetary steady states.
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a < 1 < b, and with mean 1. It is evident from considerations of neutrality that
there is no loss of generality in the assumption that E.x/ D 1. In this variant of the
Lucas model, with our generalized definition of equilibrium, a very large number
of stationary rational-expectations equilibria exist. As a preliminary indication
of the richness of possibilities, consider the following one-parameter family of
equilibria.8
THEOREM 1. In the case that government expenditure g is constant each pe-
riod, and satisfies 0 < g < 14 , each member of the one-parameter family of pricefunctions
`.n; xI ‚/ D x[1C ‚.x ¡ 1/]n2 (10)

















corresponds to a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium.
The family of solutions referred to in Theorem 1 is constructed by taking com-
binations of two particular rational-expectations equilibria to which we are able to
attach economic significance. One of these solutions we refer to as a predetermined-
quantity solution and the other we refer to as a predetermined-price solution. We
first describe the predetermined-quantity solution. For convenience, we restate the
fundamental equilibrium condition (6):
n2t D Et [ntC1 ¡ g]:
It is also convenient to remember the relationship between employment and end-
of-period real balances:
ntC1 ¡ g D .xtC1mt /=PtC1: (12)
Note that an obvious candidate for a solution to (6) is given by
n2t D ntC1 ¡ g: (13)
We refer to any solution of this form as a predetermined-quantity solution because
it has the property that ntC1 is independent of current realizations of xtC1. If nt
obeys (13), then from (12) it follows that prices are described by
PtC1 D .xtC1mt /
–
n2t : (14)
It follows from our definition of equilibrium that any stationary value of n that
satisfies (13) will generate a rational-expectations equilibrium price function of
the form
`.n; x/ D x=n2: (15)
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Equation (13) has two stationary solutions that correspond to the nonstochastic
equilibria n and n¯ depicted in Figure 1B. There are, therefore, two predetermined-
quantity equilibria, both of which are such that current monetary noise has no real
effects. It is the low-inflation equilibrium, n D n¯ that is isolated by Lucas as the
unique rational-expectations equilibrium in his model. The Lucas equilibrium is
unique because if g D 0, then in the other steady state, nDnD 0, and money has
no value.
Predetermined-quantity solutions, however, are not the only candidates for equi-
librium. Combining equations (6) and (12), it follows that
n2t D Et [.xtC1mt /=PtC1]: (16)
Consider solutions in which PtC1 is independent of xtC1.9 In this case, (16) implies
n2t D .mt=PtC1/Et [xtC1] D .mt=PtC1/;
and so, the equilibrium price function must be of the form
`.n; x/ D .1=n2/: (17)
In an equilibrium such as this, output would follow the stochastic difference
equation,
ntC1 D xtC1n2t C g: (18)
In the basic Lucas model, equation (18) is unstable in the neighborhood of the
unique monetary stationary state. If g is positive, however, there may exist a
neighborhood of the high-inflation steady state to which solutions of (18) converge
(locally). This fact allows us to prove that there exists an invariant probability
distribution for output.
The family of solutions that is described in Theorem 1 is constructed by taking
linear combinations with weight ‚ of the predetermined-quantity solution and the
predetermined-price solution. We prove Theorem 1 below.
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that, under the assumptions on a, b, and g made
above, the interval (11) is nonempty and includes ‚ D 0 (the case of pure neutrality
of money). Substitution of (10) into (7) reveals that the equilibrium condition is
satisfied by every price function in family (10). It remains to show that, under the
stochastic dynamics defined by (9), there is an invariant distribution ….n/ for the
labor-supply variable. The result that we need in order to show this is the following:
LEMMA 1. Consider the Markov process for random variable fnt g defined by
the difference equation
ntC1 D h.nt ; xtC1/;
where xtC1 is an i.i.d. r.v., and h is a continuous function of n, for n in some
bounded interval [e; f ], and all values of x. Suppose furthermost that h.n; x/ 2
[e; f ], for any n 2 [e; f ], and for any x. Then there exists an invariant distribution
….n/ for random variable fnt g with support [e; f ].
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FIGURE 2. Geometry of the construction of the interval [e; f ].
For proof of this lemma, see Futia (1982).10 Substituting (10) into (9) then yields
ntC1 D [1C ‚.xtC1 ¡ 1/]n2t C g: (19)




[1C ‚.x ¡ 1/];
v · min
a•x•b
[1C ‚.x ¡ 1/];
it is obvious that (11) guarantees
0 < v < u < .1=4g/:
It then follows that the interval [e; f ] is given by
e D 2g
1Cp1¡ 4vg ; (20)
f D 2g
1Cp1¡ 4ug : (21)
(The geometry is displayed in Figure 2.) Hence, by Lemma 1, an invariant distri-
bution ….n/ exists.
Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of a continuum of stationary rational-
expectations equilibria, indexed by values of ‚, in interval (11). One member
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of this family, corresponding to ‚D 0, is the predetermined-quantity solution dis-
cussed above. In this case, the interval [e; f ] collapses to the single point n in
Figure 1B. Hence, in the stochastic stationary state, labor supply is always equal
to n (the natural rate) and monetary shocks have no effect on allocations.
On the other hand, in the case that ‚ D 1, it is instead PtC1 that is predetermined.
Therefore, a monetary shock in period t C 1 has no effect on the price level in that
period, but it does have real effects: The labor supply in period t C 1 is given by
equation (18) so that an unexpectedly large increase in the money supply results in
an unexpectedly large output in the period in which it occurs. (Hence the realized
value of xtC1 affects both mtC1 and ntC1, and through them future price levels,
beginning with PtC1.) In general, an increase in the money supply may result in a
one-for-one increase in the current price level (the‚ D 0 case), a more than one-for-
one increase (the ‚ < 0 case), partial increase (the cases 0 < ‚ < 1), no change at
all in the current price level (the ‚ D 1 case), or even a decrease in the current price
level (the ‚> 1 cases). In Lucas’s paper, only the first type of response is consistent
with rational expectations, but we have shown that stationary rational-expectations
equilibria that exhibit each of these types of response can exist.
Note that Theorem 1 requires no assumptions about the distribution F.x/, except
that it has bounded support [a; b]. Under quite weak assumptions on the distribution
of stochastic interest payments, we can prove an even stronger result about the
invariant distribution ….n/.
THEOREM 2. Suppose that, in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 1, the
cumulative probability F.x/ is strictly monotonic in x ; that is, F.x1/> F.x2/ if
a< x2< x1< b. Then, the invariant distribution….n/with support [e; f ] is unique.
Furthermore, there exist positive constants M and " such that
jPt .n0; n/¡ ….n/j < M
.1C "/t
for any n0, n 2 [e; f ], and all t > 1, where
Pt .n0; n/ · Prob[nt < njn0 D n0]:
The additional assumption rules out the existence of subintervals of [a; b] in
which x occurs with zero probability. This guarantees not only uniqueness of
the invariant probability distribution ….n/ but that rational expectations about the
distribution of n at some future date converge at a geometric rate to the distribution
….n/ as the date is moved further into the future, regardless of the current value of
n. This convergence property is characteristic of familiar examples of stationary
rational-expectations equilibrium, and might be thought by some to be a necessary
part of a reasonable definition of stationary rational-expectations equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 2 depends on the following lemma, proved in Futia
(1982).11
LEMMA 2. The invariant distribution ….n/ in Lemma 1 is unique if and only
if there is a point n⁄ 2 [e; f ] such that for any open interval .n1; n2/ ‰ [e; f ]
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containing n⁄, and any n0 2 [e; f ], there exists an integer t such that Pt .n0; n2/ >
Pt .n0; n1/. The convergence property stated in Theorem 2 holds if there is a point
n⁄ 2 [e; f ] such that for any open interval .n1; n2/‰ [e; f ] containing n⁄ any
n0 2 [e; f ], and any integer, k> 1, there exists an integer t such that Pkt .n0; n2/ >
Pkt .n0; n1/.
It is not clear that the additional assumption made in Theorem 2 is necessary; we
do not know of a counterexample in which that assumption is not made. However,
the proof of Theorem 2 is particularly simple when the additional assumption is
made.







for e < n < f . It follows immediately from the strict monotonicity of F.x/, and
the fact that in our example h.n; x/ is a continuous function of x , that P.n0; n/
is strictly monotonic in n, for n in the interval h1.n0/ < n < h2.n0/. Similarly, it




d PT¡1.n0; n˜/ d F.x/
that if Pt¡1.n0; n/ is strictly monotonic in n, for n in the interval ht¡11 .n0/ <
n < ht¡12 .n0/, that Pt .n0; n/ will be strictly montonic in n, for n in the interval
ht1.n0/ < n < ht2.n0/. It follows, by induction, that Pt .n0; n/ is strictly monotonic
in n, for n in the interval ht1.n0/ < n < ht2.n0/. Now note that the function h.n; x/
given in (19) has the property that h1.n/ < n for all e < n • f and h2.n/ > n for
all e • n < f . It follows from this that ht1.n/ converges uniformly to the constant
function e as t !1, and that ht2.n/ converges uniformly to the constant function
f as t !1. Hence, there is a finite T such that
max
e•n• f
hT1 .n/ < min
e•n• f
hT2 .n/:
Let n⁄ lie in the open interval
max
e•n• f
hT1 .n/ < n⁄ < min
e•n• f
hT2 .n/:
Then, PT .n0; n/ is monotonically increasing in n for n in a certain neighborhood of
n⁄ for any n0 2 [e; f ] for any t < T . Then, for any open interval .n1; n2/ containing
n⁄, any n0 , and any integer k> 1, there exists an integer t such that Pkt .n0; n2/ >
Pkt .n0; n1/. Theorem 2 then follows from Lemma 2.
Theorem 2 allows us to compute the invariant distribution ….n/, and likewise
the invariant distributions of all other real variables, by simply integrating the
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A) The case of a uniform shock distribution
B) The case of a triangular shock distribution
FIGURE 3. Invariant distributions for n corresponding to different distributions of the mon-
etary shock.
Markov dynamics (9). Invariant distributions ….n/, corresponding to two different
distributions of monetary shocks F.x/ calculated in this way are displayed in
Figures 3A and 3B.
5. PHILLIPS CURVES
One purpose of the original paper by Lucas was to explain the observed correla-
tion between employment and inflation in a model in which all agents displayed
rational choice. In Lucas’s paper, in the absence of uncertainty about the distri-
bution of agents across islands, output is always constant regardless of monetary
shocks; even the short-run Phillips curve is vertical. Hence, he finds it neces-
sary to introduce informational asymmetries, to produce an explanation of the
observed Phillips-curve relation. However, in almost all of the stationary rational-
expectations equilibria displayed in Theorem 1, an econometrician making obser-
vations upon the stochastic stationary state would find a nonvertical Phillips curve,
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FIGURE 4. Covariance of PtC1=Pt with nt for different values of ‚.
even though there is no informational asymmetry, and all money growth occurs
through interest payments on money balances.
In any of the equilibria described in Theorem 1, the current rate of inflation, in
period t C 1, is equal to
PtC1
Pt
D xtC1[1C ‚.xtC1 ¡ 1/]nt ;
while the current labor supply, as a function of nt and xtC1, is equal to
ntC1 D [1C ‚.xtC1 ¡ 1/]n2t C g:
Because the distribution of xtC1 is independent of the value of nt , the covariance


















where E.n/, E.1=n/, and E.n2/ are evaluated using the invariant distribution….n/,
and E[x=.1 ¡ ‚.x ¡ 1//] is evaluated using the distribution F.x/. The general
features of the variation of this covariance with variations in ‚ are illustrated by
Figure 4.
It can be shown that12 the family of rational-expectations equilibria allowed
by (11) necessarily includes open-interval ‚ values for which the conventional
Phillips curve would be observed (small positive values of ‚) and an open interval
of ‚ values for which a Phillips curve of the opposite slope would be observed
(small negative values of ‚), as well as one equilibrium for which the Phillips curve
would be vertical .‚ D 0/. If the interval (11) includes sufficiently large positive
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FIGURE 5. Phillips curve for different values of ‚.
values of ‚, it also will include at least one other equilibrium for which there is
zero covariance between output and inflation (although money is not neutral in
this equilibrium) and another interval of ‚ values for which the Phillips curve has
an anticonventional slope. The various possible types of observed Phillips curve
are illustrated in Figure 5, which shows scatter plots of inflation and output values
obtained by sampling from the invariant joint distribution of these variables, for
several different stationary rational-expectations equilibria of the same economy.13
Of course, this analysis does not challenge the main policy conclusion from
the Lucas analysis, namely, that the mere observation of a correlation between
inflation and output in a given stochastic stationary state does not mean that a
stable output-inflation relation exists that could be exploited through systematic
policy. In our equilibria, as in Lucas’s, an increase in the mean of the distribution
of x [by drawing x’s from the previous distribution F.x/ and then multiplying
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each by a scalar a> 1] would have no effect on allocations. That is to say, for each
equilibrium that exists when E.x/D 1, there exists a corresponding equilibrium
in the E.x/ D a case, in which the stationary distributions of all real quantities
are the same, but all gross rates of inflation are multiplied by a. On the other
hand, it is not so easy to say, in our case, that upon the establishment of the
new regime (multiplication by a), there should be no real effects. It would be
consistent with rational-expectations equilibrium if the economy were to adjust to
the corresponding equilibrium in which only rates of inflation were affected, but it
would also be consistent with rational-expectations equilibrium if it were to adjust
to some other of the set of possible equilibria when E.x/ D a. This is a problem
arising from the multiplicity of stationary equilibria, which Lucas does not have
to consider. It is discussed further in Section 8.
6. STOCHASTIC GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
Our model as set out in Section 3 allows for both stochastic government expendi-
tures and random interest payments; in this section we look at another special case,
in which only g is stochastic. The reason for looking at this class of models is to
illustrate the implications of our findings for some traditional questions that relate
to the incidence of taxation. We show that the incidence of the inflation tax in this
model is indeterminate and that beliefs independently influence the incidence of
taxes. First, we set out an analogue of the one-parameter family of equilibria that
we considered in Section 4 for the case in which g is the only random variable.
As stated in Section 3, we assume that gt is i.i.d., being drawn each period from a
distribution H.g/ with bounded support [c; d], where 0 < c < 1. For a stationary
rational-expectations equilibrium to exist, we also must assume that g¯ < 14 , where
g¯ is the mean of the distribution H.g/. Among the very large number of stationary
rational-expectations equilibria that exist when g¯ < 14 , we exhibit the following
one-parameter family:
THEOREM 3. In the case that x D 1 each period, and gt is stochastic with
mean g¯ < 14 , each member of the one-parameter family of price functions,
`.n; g; ‚/ D 1
n2 C .1¡ ‚/.g¯ ¡ g/ (23)
for ‚ in the interval
1
4 ¡ g¯
g¯ ¡ c < ‚ <
1
4 ¡ g¯
d ¡ g¯ (24)
corresponds to a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that the interval (24) has a nonempty interior that
includes ‚. Substitution of (23) into (7) reveals that the equilibrium condition is
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FIGURE 6. Geometry of the construction of the interval [e; f ] for the case of random gov-
ernment spending.
satisfied. The existence of an invariant distribution….n/ is verified using Lemma 1,
as in the proof of Theorem 1. The invariant interval is given by
e D 1¡
p





1¡ 4g¯ C 4‚.d ¡ g¯/
2
:
(The geometry of this is shown in Figure 6.) The function
h.n; g/ D n2 C ‚g C .1¡ ‚/g¯
maps [e; f ] into itself for all g 2 [c; d], and is continuous in n for all g 2 [c; d], and
so, an invariant distribution ….n/ exists and the proof of Theorem 3 is complete.
Paralleling the proof of Theorem 2, one also can prove uniqueness and con-
vergence in this case, assuming that the cumulative distribution function H.g/ is
strictly monotonic for g 2 [c; d].
Different equilibria in this one-parameter family exhibit qualitatively different
behavior. For example, different quantities are predetermined in different equilib-
ria. In the ‚ D 0 equilibrium, the interval [e; f ] collapses to a single point, so that
in the stochastic stationary state, nt is constant. In this equilibrium,
ct D n ¡ gt ;
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so that consumption by the old in a given period is not known until the level of
government expenditure during that period is announced. In the ‚ D 1 equilibrium
(which exists as long as d < 14 ), by contrast,
ntC1 D n2t C gtC1;
so that ntC1 varies with current government expenditure, whereas
ctC1 D n2t ;




so that the price level also is predetermined in this equilibrium. Money creation by
the government has no effect on the current period’s price, but, by affecting ntC1
and mtC1, it affects future prices.
This implies that questions having to do with the incidence of fiscal policy have
no determinate answer in such a model. In the case of an unexpectedly large gov-
ernment expenditure in a given period, whose consumption must be decreased?
In the ‚ D 0 equilibrium, it is achieved entirely through an unexpected reduction
in the consumption of the old; the consumption of leisure by the young is unaf-
fected. In the ‚ D 1 equilibrium, it is achieved entirely through a reduction in the
consumption of leisure by the young. Individuals can be completely confident as
to the value of their savings in old age, because unexpected money creation by
the government has no effect on the purchasing power of the money they hold.
For intermediate values of ‚, the effects are intermediate between these extremes.
For ‚< 0, unexpectedly high government expenditure actually results in increased
consumption of leisure by the young, whereas for ‚> 1, unexpectedly high gov-
ernment expenditure results in increased consumption by the old. These different
possible effects have nothing to do with alternative methods of government fi-
nance. In each case, the same expenditure is financed in the same way (money
creation); the different effects are due to differences in what individuals expect.
And all of these expectations are consistent with stationary rational-expectations
equilibrium.
7. PREDETERMINED NOMINAL WAGES
Many recent explanations of the business cycle [e.g., Phelps and Taylor (1977),
Fischer (1977a,b)] assume that nominal wages are slow to adjust in response to
shocks in aggregate demand. A large body of literature has sought to provide a
rationalization of this assumption consistent with the theory of rational choice. It
often has been assumed that sticky wages can only result from a model in which
agents commit themselves to an employment contract before the realization of
the aggregate demand shocks. To date, however, this research program has been
unsuccessful. Models that assume that contracts involve state-invariant nominal
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wages [Gray (1976), Fischer (1977a,b)] are inconsistent with rational choice [Barro
(1977)]; models that are consistent with rational behavior [Baily (1974), Azariadis
(1975), Grossman and Hart (1981)] sometimes predict real-wage rigidity, but never
predetermined nominal wages.
By contrast, in our model (whenever government policy satisfies the bound
bd • 14 ), there is a solution in which the nominal wage is independent of current
realizations of stochastic shocks, despite the facts that no agents commit themselves
prior to realization of these shocks and that these realizations are public knowledge.
In the model presented here, the price level is also the nominal wage, and so,
the predetermined-price solution is a predetermined nominal-wage solution. This
might be thought to be an uninteresting example because of the model’s failure
to distinguish between wages and prices. However, we know of examples with
more complicated technologies in which the real wage is variable and yet there
exists a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium in which the nominal wage is
predetermined.14
Using our methods, it is possible to construct examples in which workers and
firms write labor contracts prior to the realization of aggregate-demand shocks and
to embed these contracts in a full general-equilibrium model. Robust examples exist
in which one of the set of possible rational-expectations equilibria has the property
that nominal wages are state independent in the optimal contract. However, the
insurance motive for contracting prior to realization has nothing to do with this
result, which depends on the self-fulfilling nature of expectations over future price
distributions.
8. A MORE GENERAL CLASS OF EQUILIBRIA
In fact, the one-parameter families of equilibria exhibited above do not come close
to characterizing the complete set of stationary rational-expectations equilibria in
these models. For example, in the case of the model considered in Section 4, the
following larger class of equilibria exists:
THEOREM 4. In the case that government expenditure g is constant each pe-
riod, and satisfies 0 < g < 14 , any price function of the form




ˆ.x/ d F.x/; (25)
where ˆ.x/ is a continuous function of x satisfying the bounds
4g < ˆ.x/ < 1 (26)
for all x 2 [a;b], corresponds to a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium.
Furthermore, if the cumulative probability F.x/ is strictly monotonic in x , then
the invariant distribution ….x/ associated with the stochastic stationary state is
unique and has the convergence property stated in Theorem 2.
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Proof of Theorem 4. The proof of Theorem 4 follows that of Theorems 1 and
2. Substitution of (25) into (7) reveals that the equilibrium condition is satisfied











where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution F.x/, it is clear that
the bounds (26) ensure that
0 < v < u < .1=4g/:
It then follows that an invariant interval [e; f ] exists, given by (20) and (21) as
before. Hence, Lemma 1, an invariant-distribution ….n/, exists. In the proof of
Theorem 2, the only properties of h.n; x/ used were the property that h.n; x/ was
continuous in x , that
min
a•x•b
h.n; x/ • n for n 2 [e; f ]
with equality only for n D e, and that
max
a•x•b
h.n; x/ ‚ n for n 2 [e; f ]
with equality only for nD f . All these properties hold for the price functions
described in Theorem 4, and so, the proof goes through as before.
Theorem 4 does not come close to being a complete characterization of the set
of stationary rational-expectations equilibria. It should be apparent that any price
function of the much more general form




ˆ.n; x 0/ d F.x 0/ (27)
is acceptable, as long as there exists an invariant interval [e; f ]. It also should be
clear from the argument thus far that such an interval will exist for any function of
form (27) which is sufficiently close to a function described in Theorem 4; that is,
for any function of form (27) in which ˆ.n; x/ varies sufficiently little with varia-
tions in n. Furthermore, even if it were possible to give a complete characterization
of the set of price functions satisfying the definition of equilibrium given in Sec-
tion 3, this really would be only a restricted subset of the set of stationary rational-
expectations equilibria, because, as discussed previously, one might equally well
include other predetermined quantities as arguments in the price function.
What Theorem 4 does establish is that the set of stationary rational-expectations
equilibria is not a simple finite-dimensional continuum as in the case of the multiple
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stationary equilibria previously considered for linear rational-expectations models;
instead, the set includes a set of equilibria associated with the elements of an open
set in an infinite-dimensional function space.15 Although we draw no conclusions
from this characterization, it does emphasize the fact that in addition to there
being a very large number of equilibria, there are a very large number of equilibria
arbitrarily close to any one equilibrium in the set. In the case of any price function
of form (25), there is an infinite number of independent directions in which it is
possible to slightly vary the function and still have a function of this class.
This local indeterminacy of the equilibrium price function poses a grave diffi-
culty for many popular interpretations of the rational-expectations hypothesis. It
often is claimed that the hypothesis denies any role for arbitrary subjective factors
in dynamic economic analysis by rendering the expectations of rational agents
completely endogenous. In the case of an economic model such as that considered
here, it cannot be said that expectations are endogenously determined by funda-
mental considerations (preferences, endowments, transactions technology, policy
regime) alone.
Furthermore, many discussions of the implications of rational expectations are
concerned with the effects of a change in policy regime, and assume that such a
change would cause an endogenous change in expectations to a new equilibrium.
This endogenous change typically is supposed to be both unique and immedi-
ate. In certain cases it is argued that the unique, immediate response will undo
the attempted intervention, so that equilibrium allocations are unaffected by the
change in policy regime. Such arguments cannot be made if rational-expectations
equilibrium is indeterminate. For example, in the case of the model considered
here, a shift in policy regime that does not alter the distribution H.g/, but changes
F.x/ so that E.x/> 1, cannot be said to necessarily have no effect on allocations,
even if one supposes that a new stationary rational-expectations equilibrium is
immediately reached. Although there will exist an equilibrium in which all real
quantities are unchanged, there will exist arbitrarily close to it a very large number
of other equilibria in which expectations would be equally rational.
What is more, the assumption that a new rational-expectations equilibrium is
immediately reached is very difficult to sustain in the case of indeterminacy. Even
supposing that all agents know the correct model of their economy, the expectations
that are rational for each of them to hold depend upon what the other agents expect.
Even in a model with a unique rational-expectations equilibrium, rational choice
does not explain how a decentralized economy will arrive at such an equilibrium.
[See, e.g., Phelps (1983).] But the problem is much worse if rational-expectations
equilibrium is indeterminate, for then agents cannot solve their coordination prob-
lem by each solving the model for its rational-expectations equilibrium and expect-
ing the others all to be computing the same solution. Complete awareness on the
part of each agent of the theoretically possible set of equilibria would give none of
them any way of guessing which equilibrium the others expected to occur. Hence
it is possible that coordination of expectations could occur only after a period of
disequilibrium adjustment; it is not clear what rules of inference agents should use
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during such a period, and so it is not even clear that eventual coordination would
result.
9. CONCLUSION
We show that, in an exact general-equilibrium model, a very large set of stationary-
rational-expectations equilibria exists. This result poses serious problems for a
common interpretation of rational expectations, according to which rationality
uniquely determines expectations in terms of market fundamentals. We also show
that, contrary to widespread belief, certain business-cycle phenomena (in partic-
ular the Phillips curve and nominal-wage stickiness) are consistent with rational
expectations and exact optimizing behavior in the absence of informational im-
perfections.
Our results demonstrate that the rational-expectations method introduced by
Lucas (1972) is incomplete. One interpretation might be that expectations may
be influenced by non-economic factors, such as social norms, or “animal spirits,”
which cannot be captured in a purely economic model. Another approach would be
to postulate a learning mechanism, as in Bray (1982) or Blume and Easley (1982),
under which one might hope that only a small number of rational-expectations
equilibria would be stable.
Another question suggested by our results is under what circumstances rational-
expectations equilibrium is unique. Indeed, for a given specification of preferences
and technologies, one might compare alternative policy regimes. If certain policy
regimes are characterized by indeterminacy, and others are not, then one might
advocate one of the latter polices. It will not always be the case that laissez-faire
is one of the regimes in which equilibrium is determinate. For example, in the
overlapping-generations model considered by Azariadis (1981) and Azariadis and
Guesnerie (1982, 1986), multiple stationary rational-expectations equilibria exist
under laissez-faire monetary policy. Grandmont (1985) gives an example of an
activist monetary policy that renders the rational-expectations equilibrium unique
in that model. This provides a possible justification for stabilization policy even in
the case of models that possess a Pareto-optimal rational-expectations equilibrium
under laissez-faire.
NOTES
1. This assumption is not necessary for the existence of the multiplicity of rational-expectations
equilibria considered herein. It is made simply for computational convenience. The model presented
in this section also can be reinterpreted as one in which there is inelastic supply of labor in the first
period of life, and consumption in both periods of life, with quadratic utility of consumption in the first
period and linear utility in the second. The interpretation in terms of elastic labor supply is used here
to allow us to discuss Phillips-curve relations in Section 5.
2. In this respect our model generalizes Lucas’s model. In the subsequent discussion in Section 3,
we consider the effects on prices and allocations of two different kinds of fluctuations in government
policy: the stochastic interest payments considered by Lucas, and stochastic government expenditure.
3. It would be realistic to assume an upper bound n¯ on feasible labor supply per capita. However,
because all equilibria discussed in this paper are such that nt is bounded, it is possible to assume that
the upper bound n¯ is sufficiently high as never to be binding.





1 if e • n • n0
0 if n > n0 :
5. This assumes that g is not too high; specifically, that g < 14 . If the desired level of inflation-
financed government expenditure is too high, there is no rate of money creation that can provide that
amount of revenue.
6. This was noted by Black (1974). For a discussion of conditions under which indeterminacy
of perfect foresight equilibria may occur in overlapping generations models, see Kehoe and Levine
(1985), Muller and Woodford (1983).
7. It is easily seen from elementary considerations of neutrality that rational-expectations equilibria
other than the Lucas solution can exist, in a model in which the only stochastic policy involves stochastic
interest payments on money balances, only if in the corresponding model without interest payments
there exist sunspot equilibria, i.e., rational-expectations equilibria in which prices and allocations
are affected by random variables that have no effect on preferences, endowments, technology, or
government policy. [See, e.g., Shell (1977), Cass and Shell (1983), Azariadis (1981), Azariadis and
Guesnerie (1982, 1986).] We conjecture that stationary sunspot equilibria can exist arbitrarily close to
a nonstochastic steady state of such a model only if the nonstochastic steady state is indeterminate.
This will be the subject of a future paper. It would then follow that, in models with stochastic interest
payments, stationary rational-expectations equilibria exist arbitrarily close to a Lucas solution only if, in
the corresponding model without interest payments, the Lucas solution corresponds to an indeterminate
monetary steady state.
8. The reference to a one-parameter family of equilibria should not suggest that what we find here
is qualitatively the same as the multiplicity of perfect-foresight equilibria in the nonstochastic model,
illustrated in Figure 1A, where there are only two stationary equilibria. Here, there is a one-parameter
family of stationary equilibria, and, as subsequently shown, there are many more than this. There
is, however, a more subtle relationship between the multiplicity of perfect-foresight equilibria in the
nonstochastic model and the multiplicity of stationary rational-expectations equilibria in the stochastic
model, as discussed in note 7.
9. Costas Azariadis first showed us that the Lucas model contains rational-expectations equilibria
in which prices are predetermined; however, his examples were all nonstationary. His suggestion that
we attempt to generate stationary equilibria of this kind provided the initial stimulus for the work
reported here.
10. In Futia’s terminology, the Markov process of Lemma 1 defines a Markov operator T on the
Banach space of bounded functions on the interval [e; f ] as
T y.n/ ·
Z
y.h.n; x// d F.x/:
It follows from Futia’s Theorem 4.6 that T is a weakly compact operator, and hence quasi compact.
Because h.n; x/maps the interval [e; f ] into itself for each x , T is a stable operator (Futia’s Definition
2.1), and so it is equi continuous (Futia’s Theorem 3.3). It then follows from Futia’s Theorem 2.9 that
an invariant distribution ….x/ exists.
11. Our Lemma 2 combines theorems 2.12, 3.6, and 3.7 of Futia (1982). Futia’s Theorem 3.7 states
that there exist a continuous linear operator V and constants M and " such that
jT t ¡ V j • M
.1C "/t
for all t , where the operator norm is defined by
jT j · max
j f j•1
jT f j:
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However, because P.n0; n/ D T t ln.n0/,
jPt .n0; n/¡ V ln.n0/j • jT t ¡ V jjln j:
Furthermore, it follows from Futia’s Theorem 3.10 that V lnn0 does not depend on n0, and hence is
equal to ….n/. Therefore, the convergence property stated in our Theorem 2 is equivalent to that stated
in Futia’s Theorem 3.7.
12. Because 1=n and n2 are both convex functions of n, Jensen’s inequality tells us that
E.n2/ > E.n/2;
E.1=n/ > 1=E.n/
with equality, in each case, only if var.n/ D 0. The function x=[1 C ‚.x ¡ 1/] is a concave function
of x for 0 < ‚ < 1 and a convex function of x for ‚ < 0 or ‚ > 1 and a linear function for ‚ D 0 or
‚ D 1. Hence, Jensen’s inequality tells us that Efx=[1 C ‚.x ¡ 1/]g is less than one for 0 < ‚ < 1,
greater than one for ‚ < 0 or ‚ > 1, and exactly equal to one for ‚ D 0 or ‚ D 1. Substitution of these
inequalities into (22) tells us that
Cov.PtC1=Pt ; ntC1/ < 0
for ‚ < 0 or ‚ > 1 and that the covariance is exactly zero when ‚ D 0. It is also possible to show that
the covariance is positive for small positive values of ‚. It follows from (12) and (21) that
. f ¡ e/ D 0.‚/:
Hence,
E.n2/E.1=n/¡ E.n/ D Ef[n2 ¡ E.n2/][.1=n/¡ E.1=n/]g






D . f ¡ e/
2. f C e/
e f
implies that
E.n2/E.1=n/¡ E.n/ D 0.‚2/:



























1C ‚.x ¡ 1/
‚¾¶
D n var.x/ > 0:
Hence, there must exist an open neighborhood .0; ¯‚/, such that for ‚ 2 .0; ¯‚/, the covariance is positive.
Certain features of the curve shown in Figure 4, such as the property that the convergence is zero
for only two values .‚ D 0 or ‚ D ¯‚/, have not been proved to necessarily hold. They can, however,
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1C ‚.x ¡ 1/
‚
D 1¡ ‚.1¡ ‚/var.x/C o.var.x//
















Hence, in the case of sufficiently small variability of the stochastic interest factor, the covariance with
‚ is in the manner shown in Figure 4, and
¯‚ D 1¡ 4 n
2
1¡ 2 n2 C o.var.x//:
13. The plots in Figure 5 are all generated for an economy in which g D 0:125 and F.x/ is the
convolution of five uniform distributions.
14. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1983) make a similar suggestion in the context of perfect-
foresight equilibrium. Our example shows that it is possible for a predetermined nominal wage to exist in
a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium, and makes it clear that the existence of a predetermined-
nominal-wage solution to a model of this sort has nothing to do with failure of markets to clear at any
time.
15. Adopting the norm
jˆ j D sup
a•x•b
jˆ.x/j
so as to make the space of bounded continuous functions on the interval [a; b] a metric space, then the
set described by (26) is the intersection of a closed ball of radius 1 with its center at the origin, and closed
ball of radius 1–4g with its center at the function ˆ.x D 1/. There is not a one-to-one correspondence
between this set of functions and the stationary rational-expectations equilibria described in Theorem 4,
because scalar multiplication of ˆ.x/ does not change `.n; x/. This consideration, however, only
reduces the number of independent directions of variation inˆ.x/ that correspond to distinct equilibria
by one.
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APPENDIX
Although the utility function assumed in Section 3 is quite specific, the results are not
dependent upon this at all. Let (1) be replaced by any function of the form
u.nt ; ctC1/ D v.ctC1/¡ w.nt /; (A.1)
where v is a concave, increasing function of c, w is a convex increasing function of n, and
both are twice continuously differentiable. Then, (4) becomes
w0.nt / D Pt Et [v0.ctC1/.xtC1=PtC1/];
and (6) becomes
W .nt / D Et [V .ntC1 ¡ gtC1/]; (A.2)
where
V .c/ · c v0.c/;
W .n/ · nw0.c/:
For preference (A.1) to permit the existence of a monetary equilibrium in the absence
of government policy .g D 0, x D 1/, it is well known that the real rate of return in the
autarchic equilibrium must be negative; that is, one must havew0.0/ < v0.0/or, equivalently,
W 0.0/ < V 0.0/. We therefore make this assumption. This turns out to be the only feature of
the utility function assumed in (1) that is needed to guarantee the existence of a very large
number of stationary rational-expectations equilibria.
Consider the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 4. It follows from the definition of V .c/ that
V .0/ D 0, V 0.0/ > 0, so that V .c/ has an inverse, V¡1, for c in some interval [0; c¯]. Then,
corresponding to the family of price functions (10), we have in the general case
`.n; xI ‚/ D x
V¡1.[1C ‚.x ¡ 1/]W .n// : (A.3)
Note that any price function of the form (A.3) will satisfy (A.2). For a function of the form
(A.3) to be an equilibrium price function, one further property must be verified. There must
exist an interval [e; f ], such that for any n 2 [e; f ], and any x 2 [a; b], [1C‚.x¡1/]W .n/ 2
[0; c¯] and V¡1.[1 C ‚.x ¡ 1/]W .n// C g 2 [e; f ]. Consider the case ‚ D 0. In this case
the invariant distribution will be one with all mass at a single point, n, satisfying
V .n ¡ g/ D W .n/:
Because of the assumptions made in the preceding paragraph, V .0/ D W .0/ D 0, and,
V 0.0/ > W 0.0/ > 0, so that, for sufficiently small positive g, there must exist a solution
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n > 0; and for g sufficiently small, n can be made arbitrarily small. Thus for g sufficiently
small, there exists a solution such that 0<n< c¯C g and such that V 0.n¡ g/ > W 0.n/. Let
g be a small positive value such that both of these are true. Now consider a small nonzero
value for ‚ (positive or negative). If ‚ is small enough, then there will exist a neighborhood
N of n such that for any n 2 N , and any x 2 [a; b]; [1C ‚.x ¡ 1/]W .n/ 2 [0; c¯], and
V 0.V¡1.[1C ‚.x ¡ 1/]W .n/// > [1C ‚.x ¡ 1/]W 0.n/: (A.4)
Let n˜.y/ be the unique n˜ 2 N such that V .n˜ ¡ g/ D yW .n˜/; by the implicit function
theorem, such an n˜.y/ exists for y in some neighborhood of 1. Choose ‚ so small that
1 C ‚.a ¡ 1/ and 1 C ‚.b ¡ 1/ are both in this neighborhood. Then let the interval [e; f ]
be given by e D n˜.v/, f D n˜.u/, where u and v are defined as a Section 4. Inequality
(A.4) then guarantees that for any x 2 [a; b]; V¡1.[1C‚.x ¡ 1/]W .n// is a monotonically
increasing function of n with slope less than one, over the entire interval [e; f ]; hence, by a
construction like that in Figure 2, V¡1.[1¡‚.x ¡1/]W .n//C g 2 [e; f ] for all n 2 [e; f ].
There must exist an interval of ‚ values, including zero, for which the above construction
is possible; for any ‚ in this interval, (A3) is an equilibrium price function. Hence, a one-
parameter family of stationary rational-expectations equilibria exists, as in Theorem 1. By
similar adaptations of the proofs, analogs of Theorems 2, 3, and 4 may likewise be proved
for the more general utility function (A.1).
It is easily verified that the one-parameter family of equilibria constructed above includes
an interval of values of ‚ for which there is a positive-slope Phillips curve, an interval
of values of ‚ for which there is a negative-slope Phillips curve, and one equilibrium
(corresponding to ‚ D 0) for which the Phillips curve is exactly vertical. Because for this
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in the text, it may be shown that for small ‚,
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Because n¡g > 0, and V .n¡g/ > 0, and V 0.n¡g/ > 0 from the construction described
above, it follows that cov.PtC1=Pt ; ntC1/ > 0 for sufficiently small ‚ < 0. Hence equilibria
exist with Phillips curves of both kinds.
It also can be shown that, if the x and g variables remain within certain bounds, a stationary
rational-expectations equilibrium exists in which prices (and hence nominal wages) are
predetermined. In general, this equilibrium will not be a member of the above one-parameter
family. It is constructed in the following manner. If a predetermined price equilibrium is to
exist, the price function `.n; x; g/ must depend upon n alone. It follows from (A.2) that
any such price function must satisfy








where the expectations are taken over the distributions F.x/. Writing q.n/ for 1=`.n/, one
sees that E[V .qx/] is a continuously differentiable function of q, that q D 0 is a solution
to W .0/ D E[V .qx/], and that
d
dq
E[V .qx/]jqD0 D V 0.0/ > 0:
Then, by the implicit function theorem, there exists for sufficiently small nonnegative n, a
unique function q.n/ satisfying W .n/D E[V .qx/] and q.0/D 0. This function is contin-
uously differentiable, positive for n> 0, and satisfies 0< q 0.0/< 1, because 0<W 0.0/<
V 0.0/. The price function`.n/D q.n/¡1 then will describe a stationary rational-expectations
equilibrium characterized by predetermined prices, if an invariant distribution for n exists
with support entirely inside the interval on which `.n/ is defined. The evaluation of nt over
time in this equilibrium is given by
ntC1 D q.nt /xtC1 C gtC1:
Suppose that b [the upper bound of the support of F.x/] satisfies bW 0.0/< V .0/. Then
bq.n/< n, for all n> 0 sufficiently small, and bq.0/D 0. It follows that there exists a gˆ> 0
such that, for any 0< g< gˆ, there exists an n⁄.g/ such that bq.n/C g> n for all 0< n⁄.g/,
bq.n⁄.g//C gD n⁄.g/> 0, belongs to the interval on which q.n/ is defined. One also will
have bq.n/C g< n⁄.g/ for all 0< n< n⁄.g/. Suppose, furthermore, that d [the upper bound
of the support of H.g/] is no greater than gˆ. Then, for any x 2 [a; b], any g 2 [c; d], and
n 2 [0; n⁄.d/], q.n/C g 2 [0; n⁄.d/] so, by Lemma 1, an invariant distribution ….n/ exists
with support [0; n⁄.d/]. Hence a stationary rational-expectations equilibrium exists with
predetermined prices.
There is no reason to suppose that either the additive separability, the absence of first-
period consumption, or the assumption of homogeneous preferences, reflected in (A.1) is
necessary for any of these results. As discussed in note 7, the only property that seems
to be essential for the sort of construction illustrated in this paper is the indeterminacy
of perfect-foresight equilibrium in the corresponding certainty model, and none of those
special features of (A.1) is necessary for indeterminacy to exist in the case of a small positive
value of g.
